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When judges must rely on newspapers to clarify a decision they decided a week
before (here and here) something seems to have gone wrong. However, while the
BVerfG seems to be taken aback by the storm of indignation that burst upon them
since last week’s PSPP decision, the judges remain adamant in their criticism of
the CJEU. Luxembourg should perhaps even fear another ultra vires decision. A
constitutional complaint is pending against Egenberger, in which the CJEU decided
—contrary to well-established BVerfG case law—that the autonomy of religious
organisations must be narrowly construed and subject to effective judicial review.
Critics of Egenberger have celebrated the PSPP decision and hope that it will pave
the way for a second ultra vires decision. I will defend Egenberger against such ultra
vires claims in this post. In my view, critics have failed to place the decision in its
proper legal context and overlooked that the CJEU followed increasingly established
principles of legal reasoning in EU law. The decision is methodologically sound,
consistent with precedent, and does not violate the criteria laid down in the BVerfG’s
case law that would normally trigger the exercise of ultra vires review. 
Legal background
Article 140 of the German Constitution in conjunction with Article 137(3) of the
Weimar Constitution provide religious organisations extensive freedom to regulate
their internal affairs autonomously. The BVerfG has consistently interpreted these
provisions to allow religious organisations to determine for themselves whether
having a particular religion is a requirement for employment and to enforce on
their employees a duty of loyalty to the organisation and its religious doctrines
(here and here). Egenberger could bring about a paradigm change in the legal
regulation of religious organisations within Germany. The CJEU interpreted Article
4(2) of Directive 2000/78 (quoted below) as requiring that decisions of religious
organisations on matters of employment should be subject to effective judicial
review. Whether religion constitutes a legitimate occupational requirement is not a
question that such organisations can determine for themselves. National authorities
must ensure that there is ‘a direct link between the occupational requirement
imposed by the employer and the activity concerned’ (Egenberger,para 63).
The Federal Labour Court that had referred the case to the CJEU subsequently
disapplied Paragraph 9 of the German Equal Treatment Act and restricted the
autonomy of religious organisations within Germany contrary to established
principles of national constitutional law.
Ultra vires review
Critics usually bring two separate but related arguments to support their conclusion
that Egenberger is ultra vires. In the first place, they argue that the CJEU failed
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to observe the limits of its competences under Article 17(1) TFEU, according to
which ‘the Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law
of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States’.
The CJEU considered Article 17 in its decision and decided that, because the EU
legislature had taken the need to respect and not prejudice the status of religious
organisations into account when adopting the Directive, to defer to and enforce
Article 4(2) of the Directive (Egenberger para 57). Critics contend that Article 4(2)
should have been interpreted in light of Article 17(1) TFEU and not the other way
around. In the second place, they argue that the CJEU failed to observe the legal
constraints laid down in Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78, which emphasises the
Member States' constitutional provisions and principles. Because Egenberger
reconciles the principle of religious autonomy and the right to non-discrimination
differently from BVerfG case law, the CJEU allegedly failed to take into account
these provisions and principles. 
Before I assess both points of critique, let’s rehearse the BVerfG’s standards of ultra
vires review. It decided in the OMT decision that competences must be ‘exceeded
in a sufficiently qualified manner’ (para 147). The actions of EU institutions must
be of ‘structural significance for the distribution of competences’ (para 147). CJEU
decisions are ultra vires when they ‘cannot be justified under any legal standpoint’
and ‘when an interpretation of the Treaties is manifestly utterly incomprehensible and
thus objectively arbitrary’ (para 149). Earlier, the BVerfG had already specified the
limits of proper legal interpretation in Honeywell: all courts can refine and develop
law via ‘methodically bound case-law’ (para 62), but a court should not change
‘clearly recognisable statutory decisions which may even be explicitly documented in
the wording (of the Treaties)’ or create ‘new provisions without sufficient connection
to legislative statements’ (para 64). The PSPP decision affirmed these points
and emphasised that the BVerfG would respect the CJEU as long as it ‘applies
recognised methodological principles and the decision it renders is not objectively
arbitrary from an objective perspective’ (para 112).
Assessed against these standards, Egenberger seems largely unobjectionable.
According to established legal principles, Member States must ‘have due regard’ to
EU law when exercising their competences (Rottmann, para 32). Thus, it is possible
that the EU, when acting within the limits of its own competences, affects areas that
lie within the Member States’ competences [eg, Kreil]. It seems unsurprising that
these principles apply to national conceptions of the relationship between religion
and the state as well. The EU has legislated on religious slaughter, and EU state
aid rules apply to tax exemptions given to the Catholic Church. The EU is neutral
towards different religions and it is, in principle, for the Member States to define the
status of religious organisations, but matters falling within the competences of the
EU might affect their decisions. 
The first line of criticism questions the decision not to apply Article 4(2) of the
Directive in light of Article 17 TFEU. However, Egenberger’s legal reasoning
is far from unprecedented: the CJEU has in the last few years recognised the
normative significance of legislation in different areas of EU law and refrained
from interpreting legislative provisions in light of the Treaties. First, after years of
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expanding the boundaries of social inclusion by interpreting EU citizenship legislation
in light of the Treaties, the CJEU put this practice to a halt in Dano, Alimanovic,
García-Nieto(note that Germany was the direct beneficiary of these decisions).
In Dano, the CJEU favoured deference to Directive 2004/38/EC because ‘the
principle of non-discrimination, laid down generally in Article 18 TFEU, is given
more specific expression’ in the Directive (para 61). Second, it followed the same
logic in recent case law on the accommodation of national identities. In Melloni, it
refused to accommodate Spain’s national identity because that would affect the
applicability of legislative norms that reflected ‘the consensus reached by all the
Member States’ (para 62). In Taricco II, by contrast, it permitted Italy ‘to apply
national standards of protection of fundamental rights’ because ‘the limitation rules
applicable to criminal proceedings relating to VAT had not been harmonised by the
EU legislature’ (para 44).
A long debate can be had about the proper relationship between the CJEU and the
EU legislature and the appropriateness of letting the latter determine the meaning
of EU primary law. However, such normative considerations are largely irrelevant in
the context of ultra vires review. The relevant question, according to BVerfG case
law, is whether the CJEU refines and develops the law via methodically bound
case law. Clearly, the reasoning in Egenberger with respect to the status of the EU
legislature in relation to EU primary law was methodically bound and consistent with
the case law just discussed. In addition, it is worth pointing out the emphasis placed
by the BVerfG on the importance of judicial decisions having a statutory foundation
in the Honeywell decision. From this perspective, Egenberger is irreproachable. Of
course, as is so often the case, the CJEU can be criticised for failing to substantiate
its decision, in particular as regard the principles that informed its decision not
to interpret legislation in light of the Treaties. However, this shortcoming hardly
seems sufficient to justify the conclusion that the CJEU has manifestly exceeded its
competences and that Egenberger should trigger ultra vires review.
The second line of criticism questions the interpretation of Article 4(2) of Directive
2000/78. Be warned that Article 4(2) is a product of legislative compromise rather
than quality legislative drafting: 
Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date of
adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating
national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant
to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and other
public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion
or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person’s religion or belief
shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of
these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s
religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational
requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. This difference
of treatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States'
constitutional provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of
Community law, and should not justify discrimination on another ground.
- 3 -
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive
shall thus not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private
organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting
in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals
working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s
ethos.
Critics emphasise the sentences in bold and accuse the CJEU of prejudicing the
right of churches and of not taking into account the constitutional traditions of the
Member States in its interpretation of this provision. However, such criticism is
somewhat misleading. First, the second paragraph begins with: ‘provided that
its provisions are otherwise complied with …’. This suggests that the legislature
intended to uphold the effectiveness of the provisions of the Directive also in case
these would prejudice the right of religious organisations. Second, the underlined
sentence in the first paragraph merely states that it ‘shall be implemented taking
account of Member States' constitutional provisions and principles’, not that these
provisions and principles cannot be restricted. Third, we should not overlook the
italicised sentence. Article 4(2) provides detailed criteria that religious organisations
must satisfy if they want to use religion as an occupational requirement. These
criteria suggest that the legislature’s intention in enacting this provision must have
been that the autonomy of religious organisations is subject to certain limitations. 
The problem that Article 4(2) poses is how to reconcile these detailed criteria with
the emphasis the provision puts on the constitutional principles of the Member
States. In my view, we must grant critics of Egenberger that principles of German
constitutional law were given short shrift in the decision. The CJEU should have
confronted the difficulties of interpreting a convoluted provision like Article 4(2)
more openly. The provision is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation,
so certainly given the constitutional issues at stake, the CJEU should have felt
obliged to justify its decision in greater detail. However, we must also recognise
that the CJEU could not have respected the constitutional principles of Germany
and enforced the detailed criteria laid down in Article 4(2) at once. It gave greater
emphasis to these detailed criteria than to principles of domestic constitutional law
in its decision. Whatever we think of this, it did not change a ‘clearly recognisable
statutory decision’ or create ‘new provisions without sufficient connection to
legislative statements’. This should suffice to reject the second argument for the
exercise of ultra vires review. 
An assessment of Egenberger must place the decision in its wider EU law context
and bear in mind the difficulties of interpreting Article 4(2). From this perspective, the
conclusion should be that the decision applies recognised methodological principles
and is not objectively arbitrary. In other words, there is no ground for ultra vires
review.
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